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A hopeful view of democracy 
Jorge Graciarena* 
I 
Medina Echavarria's concept of democracy 
More than a decade ago, in the year of his death, 
what was to be José Medina Echavarria's final 
essay was published in the CEPAL Review. With 
his customary modesty, he referred to this article 
as "notes" on the future of democracy, even 
though the way in which he approached his 
subject and the scope of his analysis make this 
one of his best-conceived and most powerful 
works. Certainly, it was a subject that was very 
near to his heart for a number of reasons: his 
status as an exile from Francoism, his deeply 
liberal intellectual calling and his personal char-
acter, which was proof against any lapse into 
authoritarianism. 
As Adolfo Gurrieri has reminded us, the 
subject of democracy made its first appearance in 
Medina's work in connection with his studies on 
economic development at least as early as I960. 
Subsequently, he touched upon the topic a 
number of times in various essays on the univer-
sities, planning and policy, and other subjects. 
The topic thus never ceased to figure among his 
chief interests, but he nonetheless did not deal 
with it on a comprehensive and systematic basis 
until his 1977 essay,1 which, by virtue of its 
nature and scope, may be regarded as his intellec-
tual last will and testament. 
Medina wrote this article during what were 
difficult years for democracy, years marked by an 
overwhelming presumptuousness that subordi-
nated the future attainment of democracy to the 
operation of market laws in line with neoclassi-
* Former Chief of the Social Development Division of ECLAC 
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cal doctrines, which blurred the distinction 
between citizens, on the one hand, and, on the 
other, consumers who acted upon their prefer-
ences and exercised their sovereignty by choos-
ing among economic options. Democracy was 
also, however, subject to the tutelage of a mil-
itary power which felt it necessary to protect 
democracy from its congenital weaknesses. 
Without endeavouring to directly refute the 
arguments then in vogue in the Latin American 
countries governed by authoritarian régimes, 
Medina chose to address the subject in a way 
which stressed the sociological, political and his-
torical foundations that have upheld the idea of 
democracy and its practice, not only as a political 
system but also as a form of harmonious social 
coexistence. 
According to Medina, democracy involves 
three basic elements: a recognition of the indi-
vidual's inalienable human rights, the primacy of 
political freedom exercised by an organized citi-
zenry and, finally, social equity as a form of 
distributive justice. These elements encompass 
the civil and political liberties, as well as the 
social and human rights, which economic liberal-
ism excluded by omission. For Medina, the dis-
tinction between the two approaches was a clear 
one and became even more so when considered, 
as he did in the article we will discuss here, 
within the context of their politico-
philosophical foundations and historical back-
grounds. When it came to choosing between the 
two, Medina unhesitatingly opted for political 
freedom, even at the risk of slighting the eco-
nomic freedom of the market, and he did so 
because he firmly believed that the supreme 
value of political democracy in terms of human 
coexistence lies in the fact that only it can guar-
antee the complete ascendancy of natural human 
rights, civil liberties and social rights. 
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Medina's references to John Stuart Mill in 
various parts of the essay and especially in the 
final quotation illustrate how much he agreed 
with Mill as to the fact that democracy resides in 
human beings; if an authoritarian State dimin-
ishes man, it "will find that with small men no 
great thing can really be accomplished". Medina 
went on to observe that this "conviction of the 
classic champion of liberalism, shared by other 
thinkers of similar stature, exalts the supreme 
meaning of politics and the decisive value of the 
human element in shaping a lasting social order" 
(p. 136). 
Thus, perhaps without even intending it as 
such, he left us a priceless and enduring legacy, as 
may be appreciated each time one turns back to 
this brief text, which addresses all the major 
issues that have always fueled the debate con-
cerning democracy. 
Before going into some of Medina's central 
ideas on this question, however, we should first 
examine his concept of democracy. His views 
were neither normative nor idealistic, inasmuch 
as he regarded democracy as an open and ongo-
ing process that would never be fully crystallized 
or take on a single and final shape. "The organi-
zation of democracy as participation by the peo-
ple depends on higher requirements relating to 
the meaning of life ... itself." There is nothing 
either of metaphysics or transcendentalism in 
this statement. Medina saw democracy as part of 
the secular order and therefore as a societal con-
dition which could be continually refined by 
means of politically-generated and judiciously-
implemented reforms, i.e., reforms based on 
"the creation of new techniques of social organi-
zation which do not, however, claim to offer 
definitive solutions" (p. 132). Democracy could 
thus, in a strict sense, never be turned into a 
dogma because the mere attempt to do so would 
distort its very nature. 
This philosophical stance gives his analysis a 
highly flexible dimension and saves it from pes-
simism when the moment arrives to consider 
the obstacles which divert the democratization 
process from its essential objectives. More than a 
political régime, democracy was, for Medina, a 
social way of life based on principles which form 
an inseparable part of it: natural human rights, 
civil and political liberties and social equity. He 
saw it as being a question of the "supreme values 
of a form of human society which has a real 
significance for man and his community" 
(p. 134). 
Certainly, however, Medina understood that 
democracy as a social and political order is not 
free from tensions and conflicts among the var-
ious sectors and social classes of which it is com-
posed. "Consequently, every liberal-democratic 
conception of the political system tends to accept 
as its point of departure the existence of oppos-
ing interests and ideological positions which 
cannot be fully reconciled at the dictates of an 
absolute truth possessed as such, but can only 
come to temporary arrangements, successively 
amplified to meet the needs of the moment, and 
worked out through agreement, compromise 
and mutual moderation of incompatible 
extremes" (p. 127). He therefore saw the inevit-
ability of conflict as a positive factor, since hav-
ing suitable institutional means of mediating 
and ultimately resolving conflicts was one of the 
functions of democracy. 
As part of this concept of democracy as a 
progressive process by which expression is given 
to certain values, a process incorporating dis-
sent, pluralism and conflict as central elements 
in its makeup and internal dynamics, Medina 
also ascribed a specific meaning to the idea of 
crisis as such. In the midst of the various inter-
pretations suggested in the course of the debate 
as to the meaning of a concept that plays such a 
pivotal role in the examination of concrete situa-
tions and historical processes, Medina asserted 
that the term crisis refers to a "particular stage in 
the evolution of a system which is marked by 
sufficient symptoms of vacillation and distur-
bance to indicate a state of transition, ruling out 
neither the recovery and reinvigoration of the 
system or its final disintegration and collapse" 
(p. 119). All crises have a temporal dimension 
involving a history ridden with "difficulties 
already observed in the immediate past and 
therefore in the present day" which also includes 
their "prolongation into the future". In other 
words, any crisis must necessarily resolve itself 
in one of the possible ways alluded to above, one 
of which is, certainly, the continuance of a sta-
tionary state that, while not involving either any 
progress or any retrogression, does entail some 
degree of internal recomposition of the system 
in question. This is why crises are never a static 
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phenomenon but instead signify, above all, 
movement, a process of transition, a shift in 
some direction towards a different state. 
Although Medina's choice of terms might be 
misleading in this respect, his concept is not 
evolutionist in the sense of entailing an a priori 
assumption that progress will be made towards a 
From the very outset, Medina addressed the 
issue raised by the widespread presence of 
"authoritarianism" in Latin America2 and 
undertook a concise exploration of its nature and 
of the explanation put forward to justify it. He 
observed that there were two schools of thought 
that merged into a broader question, and it is this 
latter issue which constitutes a common thread 
running throughout his essay. The first interpre-
tation is the economic one, which attributes 
authoritarianism to underdevelopment and con-
tends that the drive to overcome underdevelop-
ment will inevitably entail a period of 
authoritarianism since, without it, the first steps 
along the economic road to development cannot 
be taken. According to this line of thought, once 
these steps have been taken and a certain level of 
modernization has been achieved, it will then be 
possible, given the existence of other conditions, 
for a democratic political system to be gradually 
established. The other interpretation emphas-
izes political considerations, arguing that the 
problem is to be found in the State and in its 
inability to reconcile opposing interests, mediate 
conflicts and take appropriate decisions for set-
ting up a well-defined policy to promote devel-
opment. While Medina regarded the latter 
explanation as being more plausible than the 
former, he did not embrace either of these one-
sided (the economic or the political) views. 
Instead, he asserted that "both interpretations, if 
they are to be valid, must be completed by a 
'All the South American countries except for Colombia and 
Venezuela were governed by authoritarian military régimes in 
1977. 
desirable end. His idea of crisis as an open-ended 
transition is particularly relevant and thought-
provoking when applied to the analysis of the 
actual situations created in the course of the 
redemocratization processes pursued by the 
Latin American countries which have entered 
into a new political stage in recent years. 
detailed analysis of the historical and social pro-
cesses that have taken place in each case" 
(p. 114). Consequently, developmentalist 
authoritarianism is not necessarily something 
which can be defined, on an a priori basis, as 
being engendered by underdevelopment. 
The central element shared by these two 
main interpretations could thus be said to be that 
they both postulate the existence of a close type 
of "kinship" between economic development 
and democracy on a deterministic basis. In this 
and earlier essays, Medina energetically rejected 
the necessity of such an association, especially 
when it was seen in terms of a cause-and-effect 
succession whereby democracy would be con-
tingent upon economic development. In his 
opinion, past experience indicated that these 
two processes could follow parallel and even 
converging courses but need not necessarily do 
so, since either could exist without the other. 
One piece of supporting evidence in this respect 
is the fact that authoritarian developmentalism 
has often shouldered democracy aside, thereby 
denying it a role in the various "economic mira-
cles" of recent decades. On the other side of the 
coin, there are also cases of stationary economies 
existing in combination with stable democracies, 
as occurred in Uruguay during the almost 20 
years between the mid-1950s and 1973. 
Having clearly delimited the relative inde-
pendence of these two processes, Medina elabo-
rated upon his line of reasoning, since for him it 
was evident that development and democracy 
are in no way mutually exclusive either. On the 
contrary, a complex network of interrelation-
ships binds the two together, as is illustrated 
II 
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particularly clearly by a thorough analysis of 
specific situations. Indeed, he noted how much 
economically-rooted social tensions and conflicts 
are eased in highly developed societies in which 
personal incomes are relatively large and not too 
inequitably distributed. This does not, however, 
necessarily mean that one process depends upon 
the other, but rather only that democracy tends 
to become consolidated in capitalist societies in 
which an abundance of consumption gives rise to 
an apathetic type of conformism and a passive 
adherence to an electorally-annointed political 
leadership. Nevertheless, to begin with, the 
most important thing was to disprove the argu-
ment that the road to democracy excluded the 
possibility of development. This authoritarian 
concept was primarily based on a negative 
assessment of the populist movements of the 
1950s and 1960s, which had been presented as 
democratic paradigms that were synonymous 
with chaos and a threatened social order. It was 
therefore imperative, first of all, to put things in 
their proper place. 
Nonetheless, Medina's analysis of the corre-
lation between economic development and 
democracy was quite pliant in that he allowed for 
transitory contingencies. "Let us provisionally 
admit that the correlation does show a tempor-
ary validity in relation to the historical juncture 
at which it has been observed" (p. 124), i.e., for 
the time being and to a limited extent. This 
analytical context also encompassed "the demor-
alizing effects of both inflation and recession on 
political consciousness —[with] the strength of 
the impact varying in the different social sec-
Underlying observable events and processes, 
however, there is a deeper issue which subsumes 
that relating to economic development. This 
issue concerns the long-standing connection 
between capitalism and democracy by which the 
economic and political sides of the question are 
interwoven a single system. Ever since its begin-
nings, it has been difficult to make democracy 
tors", which gave rise to conflicts that, as they 
worsened, placed serious difficulties in the path 
of attempts to find a political solution within the 
framework of a pluralistic democracy. Even so, 
Medina felt that the impact and continuity of 
political habits and traditions accounted for the 
capacity exhibited by the central democracies to 
deal with the difficulties they had faced, noting 
that some of these democracies "have kept going 
with exemplary vigour during the recent years of 
economic recession". In exploring this issue 
(which is only very briefly reviewed here) and 
other related questions, Medina made a point of 
outlining the independence of political institu-
tions and their autonomy in respect of determi-
nistic economic constraints. While it is true that 
democracy functions within the framework of a 
given social and economic structure and histori-
cal background, it is also true that the extent of 
its autonomy is such that its makeup and func-
tioning cannot be fully explained in reference 
only to the pertinent historical/structural fac-
tors. Medina regarded the political rationale of 
democracy, based on participation and a wide-
spread consensus concerning policy design and 
implementation, as being sufficient and approp-
riate for the solution of the problems arising 
within the historical context. If a democracy 
were to collapse, it would therefore not be a 
direct consequence of economic stagnation or of 
any intrinsic weakness on its part, but rather of 
social upheaval and of the internal and external 
conflicts sparked by such unrest which the rule of 
law and its institutional mechanisms had been 
unable to resolve. 
fully compatible with capitalism, the latter being 
understood as a certain way of organizing eco-
nomic production and society. A never com-
pletely harmonious form of coexistence has been 
the rule in the history of capitalist development 
and of the spread and establishment of demo-
cracy, which only belatedly attained what might 
be characterized as a mature state in the central 
III 
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capitalist countries. However, this accommoda-
tion has invariably been achieved by forcing 
democracies into a kind of "Procustean bed" so 
as to make them conform to the needs of capital-
ism in each of its successive historical phases. 
This does not, however, mean that a coalescence 
has taken place whereby democracy has been 
reduced to nothing more than a mere appendage 
of capitalism or, in other words, that it has been 
converted into a capitalist democracy. For 
Medina, this position was unacceptable: demo-
cracy has its own raison d'etre, its own legitimacy 
which is not subsumed into that of capitalism; 
nor is it to be supposed that capitalist society is 
the only type of society which can uphold demo-
cracy as a political system and way of life. 
If these two historical forms cannot be made 
to converge naturally, however, then this will be 
achieved forcibly, through the predomination of 
that form which has proved to be the most 
vigorous in Western civilization and, hence, to 
be most able to impose its own terms. The fol-
lowing quotation illustrates the nature of such an 
accommodation: "According to the theorists of 
the democratic political patterns proper to late 
or more mature capitalism, the entire system, 
concerned solely for its own stability, uses an 
institutional complex whose one and only objec-
tive is the loyalty of the masses, i.e., simply to be 
able to secure a state of apathetic obedience 
which is functionally satisfactory" (p. 129). And 
this passive conformism is achieved at the 
expense of full democracy, by means of disinfor-
mation, political propaganda, ideological pres-
sures, consumerism, religious fundamentalism 
and other cultural methods of countering politi-
cal motivation and mobilization. The outcome is 
a functional sort of legitimacy, whether or not 
consciously conferred, which perverts the true 
meaning of active citizenship, the ultimate foun-
dation for democracy as a form of popular 
participation. 
In the 1970s, when Medina wrote this essay, 
a great deal of interest was being aroused by the 
discussion going on at that 'time concerning the 
gradual and irreversible decline of the expansion 
of the central economies and, by extension, of 
the underveloped periphery as well. This was 
the period following the major oil crises, when 
attention was reluctantly and fearfully riveted on 
the population explosion and on what was seen 
as the probable and imminent depletion of the 
world's main natural resources, as the experts 
speculated about "the possibility of remaining 
becalmed ... in a stationary economic situation" 
(p- 133). Much was being written about zero 
growth and its possible medium- and long-term 
implications for the structure and functioning of 
society and politics. 
Some authors set their ideas and conclusions 
within the framework of civilization itself. R.L. 
Heilbroner, whom Medina quoted frequently, 
had written a number of highly influential works 
in which he postulated the forthcoming "decline 
of industrial civilization". This thesis, with some 
slight variations, was shared by the neo-
Marxists, who felt that it was not industrial but 
rather capitalist civilization which was on the 
verge of collapse. Both of these schools of 
thought predicted that these events would occur 
well into the next century, when the elements 
and factors at work would, they thought, have 
achieved their full impact and have helped to 
produce the situations they foresaw. 
This exceeded the time frame considered by 
Medina in his essay, which, strictly speaking, was 
not a prospective study. Nevertheless, this futu-
rological debate suggested some ideas which he 
felt were pertinent to his analysis of the demo-
cratic process and its immediate future. As indi-
cated earlier, he would not accept any 
interpretation which would subordinate demo-
cracy to any given economic form, whether it be 
industrial or capitalist. Political democracy was 
capable of accommodating a varied range of eco-
nomic and social forms based on relatively dif-
ferent principles of production, appropriation 
and of the distribution of economic goods, 
although, of course, its scope was not unlimited. 
This is why he felt it necessary at this point 
to clarify a matter which would make it possible 
to draw a distinction between democracy and its 
economic foundations. Although he had menti-
oned this question earlier, it bore repeating at 
this juncture in order to lay such predictions of 
catastrophy to rest. "Vis-à-vis the doctrine ... 
that the legitimacy of the democratic régime is 
identical with the success and efficiency of the 
economic system, a vigorous reminder is needed 
that the type of domination which characterizes 
the modern State and which in one way or 
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another upholds both its liberal elements (politi-
cal rights) and its democratic features ('repres-
entation' as a legal faculty) has its origin in the 
evolution of ideas on natural law before and after 
the dawn of the modern epoch... Accordingly, no 
essential relation links the development and his-
torical consolidation of the modern constitu-
tional State and its subsequent democratic 
structure with the specific conceptions of the 
capitalist system, and consequently neither the 
rule of law nor the institutional crystallization of 
the egalitarian aspirations of democracy has 
been formulated or defined as a function of what 
we now call economic development." In order to 
reinforce this argument, a few lines later Medina 
In discussing the medium-term prospects for 
development in the Western countries, Medina 
agreed with the optimistic view expressed in the 
report presented by W. Leontief to the United 
Nations, which foresaw continued growth in 
these economies for "two or three decades", i.e., 
until the end of this century. With this growth 
scenario as a backdrop, Medina asked himself 
what the presumable outlook might be for the 
great industrial democracies in the near future 
(p. 115). This question goes hand in hand with 
another which may be regarded as crucial for the 
future of democracy: "Will it be possible for 
liberal democracy to survive in economic and 
technical conditions very different from those 
hitherto prevailing?" 
These questions usher in an attempt by 
Medina to address an issue of deep concern to 
him: the possibility that technical considerations 
could ultimately dominate all the major spheres 
of social and political life. The steadily increasing 
prominence of instrumental criteria, to the det-
riment of considerations based on a substantive 
rationale, could result in the adulteration of the 
underlying and essential meaning of the idea of 
democracy, which is chiefly practised within the 
realm of politics and through political means. In 
this connection, Medina noted that a civilization 
added: "The history of Europe is a clear case in 
point, since poverty was no bar either to the 
ardent desire for democracy or to the gradual 
improvement of the footing on which it was 
established. The history of the various parties, of 
their doctrines, and of the steady formation of 
political habits and traditions, has its fount of 
inspiration in some of the European countries" 
(pp. 124-125). In sum, democracy is an inde-
pendent political phenomenon whose historical 
fate will not necessarily be determined by the 
economic form it takes, and this has been so 
since its very beginnings. Its fate is therefore not 
necessarily tied to that of present-day civiliza-
tion, be it industrial or capitalist. 
would be irremediably threatened if an instru-
mental focus were to become the only prevailing 
rationale. In another section of his essay, he 
made a categorical statement which is worth 
quoting in full because it sums up the meaning 
which he attributed to democracy: "Philosophi-
cal criticism ... [has] emphasized and perhaps 
demonstrated the aberration implied for civili-
zation by the predominance of the instrumental 
rationale. The practical or perhaps historical 
rationale upon which depend the values people 
look to in everyday life —ethical and aesthetic 
values, values relating to community support 
and fraternity— has been increasingly dimmed 
by the instrumentality of the relation between 
ends and means in science and technique, in 
economic development and in the technocratic 
expertise brought to bear on political decisions, 
leaving the ordinary human being painfully frus-
trated in his most intimate and most vitally 
essential aspirations. All the personal —i.e., 
psychological— 'malaise of our time stems from 
the combination of the alienation imposed by 
institutions subject to the instrumental rationale 
with the anomie bred of the frustration of per-
sonal values" (p. 130). 
This is the chief threat to democracy posed 
by the present civilizing process. In "a civiliza-
IV 
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tion increasingly dominated by scientific know-
ledge ... science and technique would constitute 
the dynamic force of such a future ... Would it be 
meaningful to speak of the survival of demo-
cratic organization in such a society [which is 
—it must be recalled— an essentially political 
form of organization]?" After reviewing the 
neo-conservative arguments concerning the 
"end of ideologies" and the "death of utopias", 
Medina observed: "Some people are beginning 
to see politics as a mere illusion" (pp. 130-131). 
It would surely be a futile exercise to try to 
imagine a democracy in a world bereft of an 
explicit and pluralistic form of politics, in which 
even the most sweeping and important decisions 
were seen as a technical question and thus as the 
exclusive preserve of technocrats and their 
expertise, with the representatives of the politi-
cal citizenry being entirely bypassed. Medina was 
very clear on this point: "Neither the rule of law 
nor the concept of democracy can be reduced to 
the status of mere instruments ... the future of 
Western democracy depends on whether it can 
find itself again." 
It is very important to understand that 
Medina did not, in respect of this or any other 
topic, argue against science or modern technol-
ogy. On the contrary, he took a highly positive 
view of today's scientific and technologically-
based industrial civilization. What he feared 
were technocratic excesses and the arguments 
advanced by ideologues for the supplantation of 
politics by technical considerations and, hence, 
the replacement of government as conducted by 
political representatives of the citizenry with 
Political representation is an essential element 
of both the classic and modern forms of demo-
cracy because it ensures the participation of the 
citizenry in the taking-of decisions and in con-
trolling their implementation. After reviewing 
some of the difficulties encountered by parlia-
ments and other bodies representing the people 
as regards the effective exercise of the demo-
government by specialists and experts. This 
technocratic approach, which was energetically 
espoused in the mid-1970s, was gaining ground 
in academic and international institutions and in 
powerful and influential civilian and military 
circles. Indeed, it became the predominant ideol-
ogy of the authoritarian phase of capitalism of 
that time and its influence was felt not only in 
the countries then ruled by military régimes but 
also in nations which managed to maintain their 
civilian governments. This is what moved 
Medina to refute this argument, which he did by 
attacking it at its very roots. 
Despite these "ill winds", Medina's faith in 
the future of democracy was unshaken. He 
firmly believed that the human values embodied 
in democracy could not easily be swept off the 
stage of history. "... great importance is of course 
attached to [trends] of a strictly technological 
character [as regards the present and future of 
democracy]; but undoubtedly the keenest con-
cern is for the future lot of humanity,... for the 
extent to which the values that are still consi-
dered essential to civilization are destined to 
flourish or to founder" or, in other words, the 
supreme value of the freedom of the individual; 
the values upholding society which are based on 
solidarity, fraternity, equity, justice, participa-
tion, identity; and the forms of development 
placed at the service of human liberty and dignity 
(pp. 115, 117 and 120). These were the values 
which, in his view, constituted the foundations 
of democracy and which he saw as being threa-
tened by the "technification" of the world, of 
society and of people's lives. 
cratic powers of initiative, the reconciliation of 
interests and conflict resolution, Medina admits 
that there have been obvious shortcomings in 
the way these powers have been constituted and 
used. Presumably, in a representative democratic 
system, the gap separating actual individuals 
from the abstract State should be bridged by the 
parties and the deliberative bodies established in 
V 
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accordance with political constitutions. In var-
ious aspects, however, this representational cov-
erage has fallen short of what is called for both 
by democratic doctrine and by political practice 
in order to ensure that the democratic system 
will operate as it should. 
The resulting representational void is 
manifested in at least two forms. The first of 
these is the questioning of the legitimacy of the 
democratic political régime, which is seen as an 
ineffective means of representation. According 
to democratic doctrine, one of the functions of 
such a régime is to give effect to the "alchemy" 
by which social interests are transmuted into 
political demands. When this is not done, the 
system suffers from what are sometimes serious 
failings, failings that alter the way in which the 
political régime functions and, what is worse, 
produce a representational deficit which 
prompts people to resort to their own means in 
order to cover. Secondly, it is manifested in the 
multiplication of "corps intermédiaires" repres-
enting specific social interests; this pheno-
menon undoubtedly stems from the increasing 
complexity of the relationships between society 
and politics. This is not in itself harmful to the 
democratic system, but it can be if these interme-
diate bodies tend to fill the representational void 
that has not been satisfactorily covered by the 
political régime and, in doing so, act on behalf of 
social interests without, however, politicizing 
them, i.e., without submitting them to the 
screening process carried out by the bodies, par-
liaments and parties which perform a represen-
tational function ¡n a democratic political 
system. Even if they are presented directly to the 
government and the State, however, when such 
social interests have powerful backing, they tend 
to set up non-democratic alternative channels of 
representation. 
Major social interests are corporatively 
represented when they are championed by large 
bureaucratic organizations which then bring 
these interests to the attention of public authori-
ties without going through any intermediary 
and, hence, without integrating them into politi-
cally representative bodies. This gives rise to a 
dual representational system made up, on the 
one hand, of political channels and, on the other, 
of corporative agencies. It could be asserted that 
this duality has always existed alongside the 
party system and has served to complement the 
latter to varying extents. Furthermore, it is 
obvious that, in the past, it has never been the 
case that all social interests have been politically 
represented. The issue thus begins to take shape, 
firstly, as a question of degree, of the relative 
significance of the social interests taken outside 
the realm of the political régime and, secondly, 
as a question of the autonomy of social represen-
tation, inasmuch as when such representation 
tends to become relatively independent of the 
political system, the difference then becomes a 
substantial one. Power thus becomes heavily 
concentrated in groups outside the domain of the 
State, giving rise to complex societal configura-
tions such as those described as "polyarchical" by 
Dahl or as "polycentric" by Garcia Pelayo. These 
major enclaves of power are formed by economic 
and financial groups, employer federations, 
labour unions and ecclesiastical and military 
institutions which provide their own represen-
tation and which are generally reluctant to sub-
mit to the dictates of the political authorities of 
the citizenry and of the State as the representa-
tive of the law. 
When corporative powers gain an increas-
ing amount of operational autonomy, the rela-
tionships between social actors and citizens of 
the polity reflect a dissociation chat works to the 
detriment of the party system and political 
representation and to the benefit of large eco-
nomic and social corporations, which act on 
behalf of the most powerful interest groups in 
the society. This tension, in its most condensed 
and significant form, reflects the present struc-
tural and systemic incongruences between lib-
eral democracy and capitalism, which, 
historically, have never been resolved to the full 
satisfaction of the former. Now as before, the 
coexistence of the two has been achieved by 
adapting democracy to the structural matrix and 
to the logic imposed upon it by capitalism at each 
given stage in history. 
This new type of social power structure, 
whose influence extends into politics (in recent 
years referred to as "neo-corporativism"), was 
discussed early on by Medina ¡n his analyses of 
the newly-emerging characteristics of the 
bureaucratization and technocratization pro-
cesses, a subject which he explored in depth in 
his essays on planning. In his article on demo-
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cracy, he introduced yet another important topic 
in this connection when he discussed the forma-
tion of pyramidally-structured meritocracies 
based on a type of elitism tending to result in the 
oligarchization of the corporative leadership. 
This subject, which was dealt with by R. 
Michels in a now classic work on the European 
countries, has attracted a great deal of interest in 
the region because these processes have begun to 
have an extraordinary impact on the political 
processes involved in the transition to demo-
cracy. Indeed, the corporatization of the social 
representation of major sectoral interest groups 
is manifested ¡n the growing power of the cor-
porative structure vis-à-vis a weak State presid-
ing over a democratic political system which has 
not finished rebuilding itself and which, as a 
result, is accorded a limited degree of legitimacy. 
A plurality of corporative forces, which fre-
quently form alliances despite the divergent 
interests they represent, is thus progressively 
encroaching upon the political sphere and exert-
ing a sometimes decisive influence on govern-
mental policy measures. 
The civilian and democratic States formed in 
the wake of authoritarian régimes are still pre-
carious in their makeup, suffer from a lack of 
authority, are generally inefficient and project an 
image, both of themselves and of the political 
parties and political activity, which contains the 
undeniable elements of confusion characteristic 
of a transitionary phase. The differences 
between the relative amounts of power wielded 
by the two are, however, not only the product of 
the limitations of the democratic political 
authorities, but are also due to the fact that, 
during the preceding authoritarian régimes, cor-
porative forces gained new ground which they 
have thereafter been unwilling to relinquish. 
Furthermore, the receptiveness of these new 
social power structures to democratic practices is 
either very slight or entirely non-existent, 
depending upon the type of interest groups they 
incorporate. 
Medina brought up these points in discussing 
the "breakup of democracy" in connection with the 
"crisis of governabílity" (S. Huntington) and the 
idea of a "blocked society" (D. Bell). The possibil-
ity of an "overload" of chaotically-presented social 
demands, in the former case, or of a paralysis of the 
political system, in the latter, seriously hampers 
decision-making. In a society marked by these char-
acteristics, the political system is eventually immo-
bilized by the action of powerful antagonistic 
forces. Although Medina did not espouse these 
hypotheses in the form in which they were 
expressed, he did not conceal his concern as to their 
possible implications for "the whole essence of 
democracy as political participation". He went on 
to stress that "in the democracy of today the tradi-
tional sense of citizenship' is the most important 
thing to save, even from the perils of what are 
often generous attempts to perfect it". In other 
words, Medina placed the utmost emphasis on the 
primacy of politics as a decision-making forum 
without which democracy would be inconceivable. 
VI 
Crisis and the transition to democracy 
Insofar as possible, Medina's attitude was optim-
istic whenever there were grounds for being so, 
invariably constructive and highly realistic. This 
positive outlook is clearly evidenced in his analy-
sis of the future of democracy ín the region, 
considering, of course, the assumptions on 
which it was based. "If it is true that the foresee-
able picture for the next two or three decades 
[the Liontief report] suggests the probable con-
tinuance of general economic growth [the Latin 
American countries] may reasonably be 
expected to enjoy a period of further enrich-
ment, keeping the gap between them and the 
central countries the same as hitherto, or per-
haps even narrowing it. If the likewise favour-
able prospect for the continuity of democracy in 
the capitalist countries is also confirmed, the 
model thus emerging could perhaps help to rub 
off the burrs of the authoritarian systems pre-
vailing in the region." The latter should, how-
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ever, be the result of a process that is free of 
"interference or pressures —most of which have 
a negative effect— or of straightforward copying 
of foreign models ... rather it is a matter of the 
existence of a generalized political atmosphere 
which the Latin American nations could hardly 
fail to breathe too, given their birthright of 
membership in a common culture and their 
long-standing spontaneous links ... with the 
great democracies whose future still holds out a 
promise" (p. 135). 
Note the great care with which Medina for-
mulated his projection, aware as he was of the 
fact that these favourable overall trends might 
change either totally or in part, and that his 
predictions might therefore be fulfilled in one 
sense and yet be belied by the facts in another. 
And this is indeed what has happened. It seems 
worthwhile at this point to take a brief look at 
what has occurred during the decade that has 
passed since Medina's essay on democracy was 
written and published. The "international eco-
nomic order" has changed so much that it has 
become, generally speaking, a factor which dim-
inishes the periphery's opportunities for devel-
opment: the central capitalist economies have 
fallen back behind the defensive wall of an 
unprecedented degree of protectionism; com-
modity prices and the demand for these products 
have dropped to previously unheard-of levels, 
and the exporting countries' earnings have 
plummeted along with them; the terms of trade 
have deteriorated substantially; and the foreign 
debt crisis, which came out into the open in 1982, 
constitutes an ongoing resource drain that is 
depleting the region's investment and growth 
opportunities. The projected "two or three 
decades of growth" have evaporated, and the 
retrogression of the Latin American countries' 
economies to the levels they had reached in the 
late 1970s, has seriously exacerbated social con-
flicts. The drop in employment and the growth 
of underemployment, the decrease in wages and 
living standards observed even in middle-
income sectors, increasing margination and 
recourse to extreme survival strategies, the 
decline of the rural peripheries and the poverty 
of the peasantry —all of which is in glaring 
contrast to the consumerism of the well-to-do 
strata, whose incomes have increased in many 
cases— have pushed the social barometer up 
into the storm range. 
Nobody could reasonably deny that the social 
situation is steadily deteriorating in the coun-
tries that are in the process of making a transi-
tion to democracy and that their economies have 
stagnated or, in the most extreme cases, are even 
shrinking. Perhaps the most politically delicate 
aspect of the situation is that of both the depend-
ent and independent middle-income sectors; his-
torically one of the most effective mainstays of 
democracy, these sectors have gone into a rapid 
decline. 
¡E pur, si muovel Democracy has been rein-
stated in most of the countries whose authoritar-
ian military régimes were incapable of 
overcoming the crisis or of managing it satisfac-
torily. The specific nature of the corresponding 
events has varied from one country to another, 
but the differences among them cannot conceal 
the existence of one main feature which they 
have in common and which has become evident 
wherever the "debt crisis", with all its economic 
and social implications, has been followed by a 
sudden interruption of dynamic growth trends 
in the Latin American economies. The restora-
tion of democracy has filled the void left by the 
withdrawal of authoritarian régimes, but has not 
necessarily resolved the structural crisis which 
envelopes the region's peripheral version of cap-
italism as an historical system. In line with the 
logic that prevailed some years ago, it might 
have been thought that the imperative of pre-
serving the capitalist social order in the face of 
an outright crisis would have given rise to 
demands for an expanded role for the State and 
its Praetorian Guards. This has not, however, 
been the case, perhaps because it was neither 
necessary nor possible. Firstly, the crisis has not 
entailed any serious threats to the status quo 
which would have cast doubt upon the capitalist 
order. Quite the contrary, although there have 
been signs of discontent and social protest, they 
have not been such as to call the system into 
question, Secondly, no one can deny that the 
response capacity of both civilian and military 
authoritarian apparatuses had been exhausted 
and that the changeover was thus inevitable and 
undef fer able. 
Political demands have been for democracy 
rather than for more authoritarianism, and it is 
democracy that has been assigned the heavy 
responsibility of enduring and then overcoming 
the crisis. This is not an appropriate place to 
A HOPEFUL VIEW OF DEMOCRACY / /. Graciarena 95 
assess its possibilities of success, but it is a fitting 
time to take another look at Medina's ideas on 
the relative independence of politics from eco-
nomic development. The countries currently 
making a transition to democracy have 
embarked upon this process under the worst 
economic conditions of the last 50 years. Never-
theless, the trends being observed today bear out 
Medina's optimism, since much of the available 
political and social evidence supports the conclu-
sion, at least on a provisional basis, that demo-
cracy is here to stay. And the reason for this, 
above all, is that nobody with a sufficient degree 
of power and ability is offering a viable or signif-
icant alternative which could garner the neces-
sary consensus and material support. We thus 
continue in a state of transition, following a 
course which we hope will lead us to the consoli-
dation of the infant democracy that we now 
enjoy. 
